Tuesday, June 28, 2016
The ramifications of BREXIT for global security could be much more important than its economic effects. After all, the UK economy represents less than 4% of the global economy. A weaker pound -and a possible recession as a result- should not, in my view, have the grave effects many economic analysts predict.
But Britain is a protagonist in the defense theatre: the country is NATO’s staunchest ally, the "defense bridge" between US and EU, and the latter’s biggest contributor (both in money and means) in all EU-led operations. Would this stay the same after Brexit? Or would Britain move closer to NATO? And if this happens, what would be the impact on EU’s new defense policy orientation, and on the German-French idea of a true “defense union”? Would this be possible without Britain?
One shouldn’t forget that the Americans, for some time now, are becoming increasingly fed up of having to spend so much on Europe’s defense; their priorities are clearly elsewhere, including China’s incursions in the South China Sea. In this regard, Americans see rather favorably Germany’s push for closer cooperation and coordination of defense budgets which, according to some, should be raised to 2% of GDP amongst all EU member states.
One thing is certain: the geopolitical chessboard has changed and exit negotiations aren’t going to be easy. Certainly, the process will take much longer than the envisaged two years, unless something else happens in the meantime. HH
Wednesday, June 8, 2016
[Lloyd’s List, 8 June 2016: “Suez Canal offers up to 65% discount for Asia-North America east coast carriers”]
A few weeks ago I was commenting on the MoU Suez and Panama were signing, surprisingly with the blessing of the United States. I was saying that we should keep an eye on this development, for, although the MoU was described -as it is common in this type of agreements- as a “technical cooperation and information exchange agreement", its intentions could be quite different (i.e. collusion). Apparently "the plan" didn't quite work and the result, as was to be expected, is outright head-to-head price war.
Panama is again engaging in new demand forecasting studies. In these, Panama should keep in mind that, in servicing the US East Coast, the role of Suez and of the Mediterranean hubs (Malta-Algeciras-but particularly Tangiers) is increasing. This is so, not so much in order to save on fuel costs, but mostly because carriers are able to feeder, from these hubs, the increasing trade of West Africa.
If to the above one would add: a) the new generation of containerships (too large for the Panama Canal); b) the interest of China in Port Said and in the Nicaragua canal; c) China’s grandiose, US$ 1 trillion “One Belt One Road” network and, in this context, China’s interest in the Mediterranean ports (Venice, Piraeus), East African ports (Mombasa, Djibouti), and Gulf ports (Oman, Qatar), the future prospects of the Panama Canal do not look, at least to me, as promising as one might like them to be.