MEL Policy on the use of Artificial Intelligence

Over the past decade, the editors of Maritime Economics & Logistics (MEL) have acquired considerable experience in evaluating the originality, coherence and intellectual contribution of submitted manuscripts. Where there are strong indications that a manuscript has been produced predominantly by generative AI rather than by its listed authors, the corresponding author will first be contacted to discuss the matter and to eliminate the possibility of misunderstanding. If these concerns cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the manuscript will be rejected.

There is little doubt that generative AI is now capable of producing text of remarkable quality and, in many areas, writing that rivals or even surpasses that of human authors. This technological progress is undeniable and will continue to reshape academic research. However, the purpose of a scholarly journal is not merely to publish well-written papers. Equally important is the certification that the published work represents, the intellectual contribution, critical judgment and scientific responsibility of the named authors.

For this reason, MEL expects authors to only use specialized language software for linguistic improvement, if necessary, rather than AI agents. By maintaining this policy, MEL reaffirms that responsibility for research quality, originality and academic advancement rests with authors and with the institutions and committees responsible for evaluating and promoting them, rather than with artificial intelligence.

Professor HE Haralambides
MEL Editor-in-Chief

P.S. On a different matter, please be reminded that MEL reviews submissions only if the accompanying Cover Letter is drawn on our template, to be found on our website under ‘submissions’.

  

My Neil Kinnock years (1994-1998)

My four-year work (1994–1998) as a member of EU Transport Commissioner Neil Kinnock’s (Lord Kinnock today) ‘wise men group’ coincided with a formative period in European maritime policy. It was a time when the European Union was beginning to articulate, in earnest, a coherent vision for its ports and shipping industries, long before such issues would acquire the urgency they command today. From this work emerged two landmark documents: the Strategy Document Towards a New Maritime Strategy and, shortly thereafter, the Green Paper on Ports and Maritime Infrastructure (1996–1998). The latter was the kindle wood for all my subsequent writings on port pricing.

 The stories I could recount here are endless, but I remember and always quote this one: One day, while the committee was having a sumptuous lunch in Brussels, Kinnock walks in the (private) room quite unexpectedly. “so, you decided to spend your time on port pricing?”, he said with a big smile, before he even said hello. “Well, I promise you one thing: you will continue struggling with the same subject until your retirement”. And with hindside he was right (two of my unpublished submissions to the Commission on the Green Paper appear in my forthcoming book; in the meantime they can be found in my Google Scholar and ResearchGate profiles).

The Strategy Document was unveiled in 1996 at a high-level conference of the Commission in Barcelona. Serving as rapporteur there, and well before the advent of the euro, I delivered a statement that at the time struck many as both audacious and unsettling in its clarity: «a monetary union is inconceivable without harmonization and fiscal discipline». The remark, preserved in the official proceedings of the Commission, and widely reported in the press, captured in a single sentence a structural weakness that Europe would only fully confront more than a decade later, in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009. In retrospect, what appeared provocative was, in fact, prescient.

The intellectual momentum of this period extended beyond policy documents into scholarly work. It found expression in my book Quality Shipping: Market Mechanisms for Safer Shipping and Cleaner Oceans, first presented in London by Lord Kinnock together with the then UK transport minister, Glenda Jackson (yes, the same shining star of ‘Women in Love’ (1970) and ‘A Touch of Class’ (1973), both Academy Awards). The book marked a decisive shift in the discourse on maritime safety and environmental performance. Rather than treating “quality” as a technical or regulatory matter confined to shipowners, it framed it as an economic phenomenon embedded in incentives and market behavior. In this view, responsibility for substandard shipping could not be isolated. It diffused across the entire maritime ecosystem: to the charterer who opts for the lowest-cost vessel irrespective of its condition, to the financial institution willing to underwrite the acquisition of such a ship, to the insurer that assumes its risks, and to the classification society that certifies its seaworthiness. By extending accountability along this chain, the concept of “quality shipping” became both broader and more demanding, ultimately laying the intellectual foundation for the 'Quality Shipping Campaign' of the European Union that would later be embraced by major maritime nations, with Japan among the first to respond.

Yet perhaps my most enduring contribution during this period lies in my insistence on the role of fiscal harmonization in infrastructure investments --particularly investments in transshipment capacity-- among economically interdependent and geographically proximate states such as those of the European Union. This was not an abstract proposition. It spoke directly to the functioning of ports as nodes within integrated transport and logistics systems, where national policies on taxation, depreciation and the public financing of ports can distort cross-border competition.

These concerns found their way into the Commission’s Green Paper and continued to shape the trajectory of European port policy in the years that followed. Indeed, they remain strikingly relevant. The questions raised then still define the contours of today’s debate: Are port investments, especially in capital-intensive container terminals, to be regarded as public goods, or as commercial ventures subject to market discipline? Should pricing policies aim at recovering the full cost of infrastructure, or at maximizing throughput and connectivity? To what extent do divergent national rules on depreciation and state support distort competition between ports that, in economic terms, share the same hinterland?

Equally contentious is the issue of financing capacity aimed at attracting transshipment traffic; i.e., cargo that, by definition, is footloose and internationally contestable. Should public funds, whether national or regional, be deployed to capture such traffic from neighboring ports within the same economic space? Ιf so, under what conditions? And how about the practice of cross-subsidization? that is, charging higher tariffs to captive domestic cargo in order to subsidize transshipment flows? Is competition law applicable to such discrimination?

What emerges from this body of work is not merely a set of policy propositions, but a coherent analytical framework; one that situates ports within the broader political economy of Europe. It is a framework that recognizes the tension between national sovereignty and economic integration, between public interest and commercial logic, and between competition and coordination. In this sense, the debates initiated in the 1990s were not resolved; they were, rather, the opening chapter of a conversation that continues to this day.

HH
Anno Domini 2026, June: the cherry month
Dalian, "the pearl of the north"

 

 

INCOTERMS and the incidence of transport costs: He who pays the piper (does not always) call the tune

When we were talking about INCOTERMS last week, and how responsibilities and costs are shared between the exporter and the importer, one of my students asked who actually decides the terms of trade, given that both parties would also like to make money from arranging ocean transportation. Put simply, the exporter would prefer to sell on a CIF basis and deliver the goods to the other side, while the importer would prefer to buy on an FOB basis and arrange transportation themselves. The answer is not difficult, and there are many examples: It is the one with the strongest bargaining position.

A classic example of this is trade between the United States and China. Large American retailers such as Walmart and Home Depot often purchase goods on a free on board (FOB) basis from Chinese ports, such as Shanghai or Shenzhen. Their substantial buying power enables them to dictate terms to Chinese exporters. By buying FOB, American importers control ocean transport, negotiate directly with shipping lines, consolidate cargo volumes and enjoy economies of scale in logistics. However, the reverse may occur in sectors where Chinese exporters possess stronger bargaining power or specialised know-how, for example in certain machinery or turnkey equipment exports. In these cases, large Chinese state-owned importers such as Sinopec and CNOOC increasingly prefer FOB purchases, as this supports the expansion of Chinese tanker companies and maritime services.

Similarly, we observe CIF sales, particularly to smaller overseas buyers, in the case of Germany’s high-value industrial exports, such as capital goods, chemicals, and specialised engineering products. The technological superiority and strong brand position of German manufacturers gives them the leverage to organise transport themselves, often through long-standing relationships with freight forwarders, insurers, and shipping companies.

The oil trade perhaps offers the clearest example of how bargaining power determines Incoterms. Historically, major oil exporters such as Saudi Aramco and other Gulf national oil companies have preferred to sell crude oil on a free on board (FOB) basis at the loading terminal. Under this arrangement, the buyer  -often a large international oil company or refinery-  owns or charters the tanker, arranges insurance, and controls the maritime logistics chain. This suited both parties: exporters could focus on production, while buyers such as ExxonMobil, Shell and BP had enormous shipping expertise and controlled large tanker fleets or had long-term time charters with oil producers. Conversely, during periods of weak tanker markets, oil exporters preferred CIF sales because freight rates were low, allowing them to bundle transport competitively into the sales price. This was the case in the 1970s, when the cunning offer of a deluge of time charter contracts to shipping companies led to excessive newbuilding orders and an oversupply of tanker tonnage, resulting in low freight rates that suited oil producers well. It took 20 years for that oversupply to be absorbed.

Thus, INCOTERMS are not merely technical trade clauses. They often reveal the underlying balance of economic power between trading nations, multinational firms, and supply-chain actors.

The incidence of transport costs is a related concept. Here, the question is not who ‘pays the piper’ (i.e. the carrier), which is simply determined by the agreed INCOTERMS (FOB or CIF), but rather who ultimately bears the burden of transport costs. In the case of a CIF sale, for example, the exporter is responsible for arranging transportation of the goods to the buyer’s port or beyond. However, the CIF price that the buyer pays includes transport costs. Thus, although the exporter pays the carrier, they are compensated by the foreign importer, who therefore bears the actual cost of transport. As we will see in a future post, the burden of transport costs is shared between the two parties according to their respective price elasticity of demand and supply. The party bearing the brunt of transport costs is the one with the lowest elasticity: the exporter of fruit and the importer of oil, for example.

HH, June 2026, Dalian